The claim that animals
have 'rights' was first put forward by the Australian philosopher Peter Singer
in the 1970s and has been the subject of heated and emotional debates ever
since. Often the same organisations that campaign on environmental issues (e.g.
Greenpeace) are also concerned for the welfare of animals: both sets of
concerns derive from a commitment to the value of Nature and the Earth. The
question of animal rights might well come up in a debate on biodiversity, and
is one with so many political and social implications that it is also worth having
in its own right. This debate is about the ethical principles at issue; the
separate debates on biodiversity, vegetarianism, zoos, blood sports, and animal
experimentation deal with more of the concrete details.
Since the notion of
rights was developed, society has slowly moved to include more and more groups
under the protection of those rights. It seems absurd now to suggest that
women, the poor, and people who are not Caucasian should not have rights. Some
argue that it is equally absurd to exclude animals. Will we someday regard the
status quo as equally unethical as the time of slavery and female oppression?
Or do rights only extend as far as the human race? Can we treat animals in a
more ethical fashion without giving them rights? What would change if we did
give animals rights?
A note on strategy:
many harms can be identified by the proposition in this debate. We frequently
harm animals when we eat meat, wear leather or fur, engage in battery/factory
farming, engage in horseracing, scientific testing, hunting, trapping, and
culling or keep animals in zoos, circuses and rodeos. We even harm our own pets
when we put them down, refuse to provide expensive medical treatment, over or
under feed them, neglect to pay them attention, keep them in small enclosures,
keep them in our handbags or cars or force them to perform in shows, wear
clothes etc. We need to protect animals with rights. The proposition will have
to make some decisions as to which of these activities they want to protect
animals against. They need also to decide which rights they will grant animals.
Will it be all rights that human beings have? Will it be only the right to
life? Gary Francione argues that the only right animals need is the right not
to be considered property.
The opposition does not have to argue that we can do whatever we want to
animals. They may argue that we have only indirect duties to animals or that we
should still avoid cruelty to animals but should not give them rights.
Pros
|
Cons
|
Animals are intrinsically worthy of rights because they
are sentient. Sentience is the property of
being conscious. Sentience brings with
it the ability to experience. There is a massive difference in the way that
we treat sentient and non-sentient beings instinctively. We see nothing wrong
with forming relationships with one’s pets but we tend to deem people with
emotional relationships to objects mentally ill. Here we are talking about
something more than sentimentality but rather the kind of relationship in
which one is concerned with the other party’s emotional wellbeing. We even
feel concerned about the wellbeing of sentient beings which whom we do not
have a personal connection. For example we may feel upset when we see a dog
run over on the road. This would be a very difficult reaction to how we might
feel if we see an object crushed by a car. We feel moral outrage at the
clubbing of seals.
The instinctive way which we differentiate between
these two categories relates to the type of value they have. Whilst objects
have value because of how they affect us - e.g. they are useful or remind us
of a good time or person – we believe that animals have intrinsic value.
This means that a sentient being must never be treated
as a means rather than an end in and of itself. Animals are sentient.
Therefore, animals must not be treated as a means to an end but as
intrinsically valuable.
|
First off, you are
appealing to instincts which not everyone has. People who work on farms are
happy to slaughter animals. A lot of people do not own pets simply because
they do not feel any affection towards animals and care more for material
objects. Many people do not care about the clubbing of seals. It is human
beings of course who perform these clubbing, murder sharks, poach etc.
Furthermore, it is irrational that people care about their pets because cows
are equally as sentient as animals yet people are happy to eat veal and
battery farmed beef and clearly do not care about the cow.
People treat pets as
property. They buy and sell them, put them down when they contract illnesses
that are too expensive to treat, give them away when they move houses etc.
These are things that they certainly wouldn’t do to human beings. If you want
to argue according to what humans do instinctively then we instinctively
value humans more than animals and are happy to eat and kill animals.
Furthermore, we do
not think that using a descriptive claim- what humans feel instinctively-
means that you can then make a prescriptive claim – that all sentient beings
deserve equal consideration.
In many ways we treat other human beings as only
extrinsically valuable. Neo-Malthusians believe we should allow the poor to
die of hunger to ensure that the current population does not suffer from the
scarcity that arises from overpopulation. Many wars have involved killing
lots of people to achieve political aims. Therefore, we often treat humans as
extrinsically valuable.
|
Speciesism is wrong. Just as racism is wrongful discrimination against beings of a different
race and sexism is wrongful discrimination against a being of a different
gender, speciesism is wrongful discrimination against a being of a different
species. Wrongful discrimination occurs when there is no other reason for the
discrimination except the mere fact that the being is of the race, sex, or
species that they are. For example, if an employer refuses to employ a black
woman over a white woman because she has an inferior qualification this is
justified discrimination whereas if he refuses to employ the black woman
simply because she is black then this is wrongful discrimination. Human
beings are speciesist towards animals because we sacrifice their most
important needs for our trivial desires: their life for our enjoyment of a
burger.
You might think that we are allowed to have special
relationships to people that are similar to us but there is a difference
between special relationships and being active cruel and discriminatory. Our
evolutionary instinct to protect our own species may not be ethically correct
in contemporary society.
Similarly, we ought not to 'put down' animals who are
too expensive to care for. We do not allow human beings to kill off their
children when they experience financial difficulty because we believe that
human beings value their lives. It would be justifiable to kill off something
that has no interest in living, such as a plant, but since we believe that
animals do have an interest in living it would be speciesist to kill off a
puppy simply because it is not human. We know that society believes animals
have an interest in living sometimes because there is outcry when baby seals
are clubbed or when elephants are poached for their ivory. Yet at other times
we are happy to eat animal flesh and wear leather. This is a contradictory
stance. We ought to be consistent in our views and to condemn speciesists.
Refusing animals rights is speciesist. Speciesism is
wrong. There
|
We agree that speciesism is wrong but we do not think
that refusing animals rights is speciesist because there are relevant moral
differences between animals and humans.
Or: There is nothing wrong with speciesism. It is
natural to value the lives of one's own species more than those of another
species because we are programmed that way by evolution. We are expected to
care more about our own families than about strangers and similarly to value
the lives of our own species more than those of animals. It is only natural
and right that if we had to choose between a human baby and a dog being
killed we should choose the baby.
|
Animals are equal to human beings. It is true that animals and human beings are
different. It is also true that men are different from women and children
from adults. Equality does not require beings to be identical. It is true
that whilst many people argue women should have the right to abortion, no one
argues the same for men because men are unable to have an abortion. It is
similarly true that whilst most people believe all human beings have a right
to vote, no one argues that animals deserve a right to vote – even those who
support animal rights.
Equality does
not mean that beings all deserve the exact same treatment. It means rather
that we consider equally the equal interests of animals and humans. If we
deem amount A to be the maximum amount of suffering a person be allowed to
endure, then that should apply equally to an animal, though humans and
animals may suffer different amounts under different circumstances.
The principle of equality advocates equal
consideration, so it still allows for different treatment and different rights.
Equality is a prescriptive rather than a descriptive concept. What’s
important is that beings should ONLY be treated differently where there is a
morally relevant difference between them. For example, we can justifiably
deny dogs the right to vote because there is a relevant difference in
intelligence between dogs and humans. However, there is no justification for
battery-farming chickens who have a capacity to suffer. There is evidence
that they experience fear, pain and discomfort. Although chickens may be less
intelligent and unable to speak , these differences are not morally relevant
to whether or not they should be placed in these conditions.
We ought to consider animals equally to the way we
consider humans. If we were to do so we would give animals rights. We ought
therefore to give animals rights.
|
Equality requires
that two beings are actually equal on some fundamental level. Human beings
have certain essential similarities that make them equal. These do not
stretch to animals. Human beings are able to distinguish right from wrong
while animals have no notion of ethics. We are thus able to consider what
kind of a society we want to live in and we are affected when we feel that
there is social degradation. Animals, however, do not have this sense. We
have fundamental dignity which animals do not. This is clear in the fact that
animals do not experience shame or embarrassment, desire respect, or have a
notion of self. Furthermore, human beings can consider their future and have
particular desires about how they want their life to play out. These are
different for every individual. This is why we are concerned with choice and
protecting individualism and religion. Animals on the other hand are
concerned only with immediate survival. They have only instincts, not
individual desires and wants.
For these reasons, we can't consider animals to be
equally morally considerable. As for the propositions standard of relevance
for the criteria which distinguish animals from humans in any given case, we
would argue that the fundamental individuality and humanity of our species is
relevant in every case because it makes animal life fundamentally less
valuable.
|
Even if it matters whether or not humans and animals
are similar, humans and animals are in fact similar enough that both should
be granted rights. We have already
noted that beings do not need to be similar in order to be equally morally
considerable. Assuming but not conceding that this is false, we will prove
that animals are in fact incredibly similar to human beings, so much so that
we should grant them rights.
First of all, animals have an equal capacity to
experience pain. While we are unable to know exactly what other humans or
animals are experiencing, we can make inference from what we observe. According
to Peter Singer: “Nearly all the signs that lead us to infer pain in other
humans can be seen in other species...The behavioural signs include writhing,
facial contortions, moaning, yelping or other forms of calling, attempts to
avoid the source of pain, appearance of fear at the prospect of its
repetition, and so on”.
In addition we know that animals have nervous systems
very like ours, which respond physiologically as ours do when the animal is
in a circumstance in which we would feel pain—an initial rise of blood
pressure, dilated pupils, perspiration, an increased pulse rate, and, if the
stimulus continues, a fall in blood pressure. Although human beings have a
more developed cerebral cortex than other animals, this part of the brain is
concerned with thinking functions rather than basic impulses, emotions, and
feelings. These impulses, emotions, and feelings are located in the
diencephalon, which is well developed in many other species of animals,
especially mammals and birds.” Animals therefore have the capacity for
physical and emotional suffering, and so should be granted rights.
|
Even if animals are
able categorize images in photographs and learn sign language, they are still
phenomenally less intelligent than human beings. They will never study
philosophy or perform brain surgery or even invent a wheel. Furthermore,
intelligence does not prove the ability to self-actualise. Mourning others
does not prove that animals value their own lives. Perhaps it implies that
animals enjoy company but whether they consider the value of their
companion's life and their future potential is questionable. Without the
ability to value one's own life, life itself ceases to be intrinsically
valuable.
The farming of
animals does involve death but it is difficult to prove that death is
intrinsically a harmful thing. Pain is certainly a harm for the living but
animals are farmed are killed very quickly and they are stunned beforehand.
Animals on farms do not know that they will be killed so there is no
emotional harm caused by the anticipation of death.
There is no evidence that the painless killing of
animals should carry any moral weight.
|
Even if we did think that animals were less intelligent
than humans beings they should be protected by rights. Babies and individuals with learning disabilities may
lack intelligence, a sense of justice and the ability to conceive of their
future. We ensure that babies and the learning disabled are protected by
rights and therefore these factors cannot be criteria by which to exclude a
being from the rights system. Therefore, even if animals are not as advanced
as human beings they should be protected by rights. An inability to know
what's going on might make being experimented on etc even more frightening
and damaging for an animal that it may be for a human being.
|
We do not analyse human beings on a case by case basis
but rather by what distinguishes human beings as a whole, as a species.
Infants have the potential to become rational and autonomous etc. The
profoundly retarded represent flawed human beings. Retardation is not a human
characteristic just as being 3-legged is not a characteristic of a dog though
there are both retarded humans and 3-legged dogs.
|
We are morally responsible creatures and we can survive
perfectly well without being cruel to animals. Animals are different because
they need to hunt to survive and are not morally responsible. The interests
they satisfy by being cruel to other animals (namely the need to eat) are
momentous whereas the human need to wear a fur coat or have a tasty burger
instead of a vegetarian pasta dish is trivial.
|
We are at the top of
the animal hierarchy and should treat other animals accordingly in order to
further our own species. We have always been
superior to animals. Just as a lion can kill antelope and a frog can kill
insects, so too human beings have struggled their way to the top of the food
chain. Why then can we not exercise the power we have earned? Animals
exercise their power and we should do the same. It is our natural obligation
to do so.
The reason we have always killed animals is because we
need them. We need meat to be healthy and we need to test medicines on
animals to protect our own race. We use animals to further our own race. This
too is surely a natural obligation.
|
There is a different between being morally responsible
and being morally considerable. Human beings are both. Moral responsibility
implies a duty and therefore a capability to act in an ethical manner.
Animals can not of course be morally responsible as they do not have the
intellectual capacity to ascertain what is right and wrong, only instincts as
to how to survive. We cannot expect animals to be morally responsible but
this does not mean that human beings do not have a duty to be morally
responsible. It would be ideal for all beings to act in an ethical manner but
only humans are capable of considering ethics and therefore we are the only
morally responsible beings. Moral considerability refers to whether or not a
being deserves to be treated in an ethical manner. There is a burden on the
proposition to show why moral considerability relies on being morally
responsible. Profoundly retarded human beings and babies are unable to be
morally responsible and yet we consider them to be morally considerable.
|
Animals are not moral agents. It makes no sense to give animals rights because they
cannot makes decisions about what is right and wrong and will not try to
treat us in an ethical manner in return. Why make them a moral agent by
giving them rights?
|
We clearly have direct duties to animals if we condemn
the clubbing of baby seals and like activities. Furthermore, it is not enough
simply to state what duties we do and don't have. There needs to be a reason
why we do not have direct duties to animals. What distinguishes them from
human beings that might answer this question? We would argue that there is
nothing. Animals unlike other 'property' can suffer and feel pain and have an
interest in living.
|
We only have
indirect duties to animals. Philosophers such as
Immanuel Kant argue that we only have indirect duties towards animals. This
means that we may not treat animals in such a manner that our actions are in
conflict with our duties towards human beings. A human has no duty towards a
dog not to kick it but a human has a duty towards the dog's owner not to
damage his property. Pigs and cows are not loved by any human being so we
cause no harm when we kill and eat them. Though the farmer may have owned the
cow before, the beef becomes our possession when we purchase it. Wild animals
are not owned by any human being so we may do to them what we wish.
Some people argue
that cruelty towards animals can lead to cruelty towards humans but there is
no evidence that people who work in slaughterhouses are more violent towards
other people. In fact, there seems little connection at all between how
people treat animals and humans. A slave driver may adore and pamper his dog
but beat and kill his slaves.
If we have no direct duties to animals how can we grant
them legal protection in the form of rights? The law should only prevent us
harming animals when that clearly harms other people. For example, by killing
a dog we infringe another person's human right to property.
|
If only rational beings should be protected by rights
then we should not protect babies or profoundly retarded people; but this is
absurd. Animals do make choices according to their preferences e.g. lions
choose a mate and dogs choose a spot to lie in the sun One is able to have
interests without language because it is easily possible to be aware of a
desire and understand that desire even if one does not think of that desire
in words. Furthermore, there is some evidence that animals have languages of
their own e.g. dolphins, birds.The challenger can also reject either theory
of rights in favour of the other.
|
Animals have no
interests or rationality. Some philosophers
argue that only beings that are able to make rational choices can have moral
rights because the function of rights is to protect choice. Animals are not
able to make rational choices because they can only follow instinct, they
cannot follow logic.
Some philosophers believe that the function of rights
is to protect interests. An argument from R.G. Frey argues that animals do
not have interests because they do not have language. In order to desire
something one must believe that one does not currently have that something
and therefore believe that the statement ‘I have x’ is false. One cannot have
such a belief unless one knows how language connects to the world. Animals
can’t talk so they certainly are unable to know what it is that the sentence
‘I have x’ means in the real world. Therefore animals cannot have desires.
Without desires animals cannot have interests. If the function of rights is
to protect interests then animal rights serve no purpose.
|
There is no reason why the rights we grant animals need
be the same rights that we grant human beings. There may be laws that protect
animals but these will be taken more seriously as rights because of the status
we give to rights. Furthermore there are several rights that do apply to
animals: the right to life, freedom of movement and the right not to be
subjected to torture.
|
Most rights have no
bearing for animals. The right to
dignity would mean nothing to an animal. Animals are incapable of being
humiliated and are not harmed by being reduced to human servitude. A dog is
not ashamed of its nudity or having to eat out of a bowl and wear a leash.
Animals happily copulate and defecate in front of humans and other animals.
What exactly an undignified action might be for an animal it is difficult to
say.
The right to
education, to vote, to fair trial, to be innocent until proven guilty, to
privacy, marriage, nationality, religion, property, freedom of thought, freedom
of speech, workers rights and shelter all seem impossible to apply to
animals.
If we specially tailor rights to animals then how is
that different to the status quo where we have certain laws protecting
animals?
|
0 Comments