Motion #32: THIS HOUSE WOULD ALLOW PRISONERS TO VOTE

Many countries restrict the right of those sentenced to imprisonment to vote in elections. For example, convicted prisoners are automatically banned from voting in Armenia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Luxemburg, Romania, Russia and the United Kingdom. In Australia, prisoners are only entitled to vote if they are serving a sentence of less than three years. Eighteen European states, including Spain, the Netherlands and the Republic of Ireland, place no formal prohibition on prisoners voting. In practice, however, it is often difficult for prisoners in some of these countries to vote: in the Republic of Ireland, prisoners have the right to be registered to vote in their home constituency, but have no right to either a postal vote or to be released to cast a vote at a ballot box.

The issue is particularly controversial in the United Kingdom and the USA. In April 2001, the British High Court rejected a case brought by John Hirst (a man serving a life sentence for manslaughter), who argued that the ban on prisoners voting was incompatible with the Human Rights Act 1998. In March 2004, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the British government was in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights; the European Court's Grand Chamber rejected the British government's appeal in October 2005. Proponents argue this is proof that the right to vote is an unalienable right that cannot be taken from a prisoner, regardless of the severity of his crime. Opponents maintain that disenfranchisement is a suitable punishment for those who have proven unable to adhere to society's laws and will act as a deterrent against re-offending. As a result, in the United States, one in forty Americans of voting age are ineligible to vote because they are, or have been, in prison. The arguments below relate directly to whether those currently serving prison sentences should be allowed to vote.

Pros	Cons
Prisoners are less likely to re-offend if encouraged to participate in the civic process as part of their rehabilitation. Prisoners are more likely to ease comfortably and peacefully back into civilian life if, whilst in prison, they retain links with the democratic process. Enfranchisement confers not only self-worth and meaning within a society, but can encourage research and engagement with contemporary issues. To deny this right is to force 'the disinherited (to) sit idly by while others elect his civil leaders and while others choose the fiscal and governmental policies which will govern him and his family'. Such an outcome conveys to prisoners that not only they committed a crime, but that they committed that crime because they were incapable of acting in a manner fit for society. Mistakes made by otherwise altogether rational, beneficial members of society should not be punished by preventing their say in how that society is run.	Prisoners care little about the politicians and political process that puts them in jail, therefore enfranchisement would do nothing to discourage them from re-offending. These are citizens who have shown that their means to correct supposed wrongs are not that political process or the rule of law, but crime. Prison should be about deterring criminals from re-offending through taking away their rights, like freedom, and demonstrating to them the price paid if you act contrary to the interests of society at large. That would be effective as part of their rehabilitation.
Prisoners retain their right to basic human rights. Prisoners remain human beings. We should respect their human rights and should infringe upon their liberty as little as possible, except where it concerns the protection of the public. Denying prisoners the right to vote does not protect the public in any way and is therefore an unwarranted infringement upon the human rights of prisoners. As the U.S. Congress decreed in 1993, 'the right of citizens to vote is a fundamental right'. Those rights which are unalienable should not be lost when one is incarcerated.	Prisoners remain human beings but the right to vote is not fundamental, for it is not granted to all; only the trusted members of society are granted the right to vote; Minors, for example, are deemed not responsible enough and therefore have to wait until they are a certain age for the right to vote. Prisoners are deemed similarly irresponsible and therefore stripped of their right. As the U.S. Supreme Court ordered in 2000, the law 'does not protect the right of all citizens to vote, but rather the right of all qualified citizens to vote'1. Prisoners disqualify themselves through their actions; if, as a British Member of Parliament put it, the courts deem a prisoner unfit for normal society, how can it be sensible to give them a sayin how that society is run?’
The views and needs of prisoners should be represented in a democratic system. The refusal to grant prisoners the right to vote 'is not demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society'. Such societies pride themselves on the participation of all in the political process, regardless of wealth, class, gender or sexual orientation. The objective of such systems, to ensure that all views are represented fairly and voters represented equally, does not stop at the gates of a prison. Issues such as prison overcrowding and abuse by warders are not treated seriously as political issues, since those most directly affected cannot vote and the public generally has little interest in prisoners' well-being. Prisoners should also have the opportunity to influence the formation of policy on healthcare, education, the environment and all the other issues that affect the world into which almost all of them will someday be released. Prisoners are not treated as "civically dead" when it benefits the State: they are liable for taxation on any earnings and savings that they have. There should be no taxation without representation.	If prisoners refuse to act responsibly in a democratic system, why should their views and needs be represented? As regards the claim that since they pay tax, they deserve representation, in practice few prisoners earn enough to be liable for taxation. In any case, the right to vote does not follow from the obligation to pay tax. In many countries, people start earning money and paying tax before they are old enough to vote (particularly if they leave school as soon as they are allowed to do so). This implies that the right to vote is given to those who can be expected to use it responsibly. Those convicted of serious enough crimes to be imprisoned have shown that they have no respect for society and, given the vote, would 'make a mockery of justice'. They therefore cannot be trusted to vote responsibly in the interests of society; many would probably simply vote for candidates promising lighter sentences for criminals. Prisoners' interests are already represented by NGOs and statutory prison inspection bodies, which ensure that they are not ill-treated. They do not deserve any further representation.
The legislature of the state is charged with determining whether prisoners have the right to vote. The right to vote is enshrined in the constitution or legislation of all democratic states and their collective parts. Governments, national and state, and their elected officials are charged with passing the changes to such documents that would permit or deny the right to vote to specific groups in society. In the United States, only two states, Main and Virginia, have laws allowing incarcerated felons to vote. In Australia, a 2008 High Court ruling passed the right to vote to all felons serving sentences of three years of less. Both examples prove the capacity of the state legislature to rule on the issue of the prisoner's right to vote.	A legislative mechanism on its own is insufficient to determine whether prisoners are granted the right to vote in any specific environment; a public and political will must also be present. When the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the British denial of prisoners' right to vote was a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights, public outcry in Britain, both among the general population and in Parliament, prevented the passing of new legislation. In February of 2011, the British Parliament voted 234 to 22 in favor of maintaining the ban, in direct repudiation of the European Court's insistence that the law be changed.
Linking a ban on voting to imprisonment is arbitrary and therefore wrong. Many people who commit serious crimes are not sent to prison because of their age, the effects upon their dependents or the likelihood that they will not re-offend. Others committing equivalent or lesser crimes, without these special circumstances, may be imprisoned. Even if it were ever right to deprive people of the vote as a punishment, this should not automatically be associated with imprisonment, but should be decided separately, as in France and Germany. As the Australian Democrats argue, 'to deny [the right to vote] is to impose an additional penalty on top of that judged appropriate by the court’.	The supposed arbitrary nature of disenfranchisement for prisoners is not an argument for letting all, or indeed any, prisoners vote. The imposition of a prison sentence is a good general index of the seriousness of a crime, and those who have committed serious crimes should suffer "civic death". Where people are exceptionally not imprisoned, they should be deprived of the right to vote for the period for which they would usually have been imprisoned. As David Cameron has admitted, 'it makes me physically ill to contemplate giving the vote to prisoners. They should lose some rights including the right to vote'.
Few, if any, people are deterred from crime by the prospect of being unable to vote. People are deterred from committing crimes by the prospects of their movement being restricted and of being separated from loved ones. The effectiveness of a sentence can be measured by how well it protects the public, how well it rehabilitates the offender, how well it reverses the effects of the crime committed and how well it deters future offending. Banning prisoners from voting is either counterproductive (i.e. in terms of rehabilitation) or has no positive effect given its low visibility as a consequence of a felony conviction.	Denying prisoners the right to vote acts as an effective deterrent to potential offenders and re-offenders. Banning prisoners from voting is one part of a package of measures that exclude prisoners from normal society, the most obvious of which are restrictions on movement, communication and employment. By itself, a ban on voting may have minimal deterrent effect. As part of this package of measures, however, it sends out a strong signal of society's revulsion at those who commit crime, thereby discouraging law-breaking. As Roger Clegg notes, 'barring felons from voting is one way society sends the message that committing a serious crime has serious consequences'.
Rehabilitation, which is essential if they are to avoid re-offending after being released, is aided most by enfranchisement, not the denial of the right to vote. Denying prisoners the vote implies that they are sub-human: this damages their dignity and sense of self-worth, undermining efforts to help them control their behavior. Voting encourages prisoners to take an interest in current affairs, which will aid their reintegration into society. Where prisoners are allowed to vote, they are usually required to vote in their home constituency, to avoid several hundred inmates in one jail causing a sudden swing in the constituency in which the jail is sited. This encourages them to take an interest in the particular community from which they came and into which they will probably be released.	Denial of the right to vote will aid prisoner rehabilitation by forcing prisoners to regret their actions. Rehabilitation should focus on making prisoners realize and sincerely regret the effects of their actions. It should not aim to give them a feeling of dignity or the illusion that they are full members of society. Prisoners can only be given the rights of members of society when they are deemed capable of acting as responsible members of society (i.e. when they are released). As Justice Brennan stated, disenfranchisement is 'the very antithesis of rehabilitation, for instead of guiding the offender back into… society, it excommunicates him and literally makes him an outcast’.
There is no justification to deny to anyone, including prisoners, their fundamental civic rights. Furthermore, denying prisoners the right to vote implies more than mere civic death and punishment for their crimes, it implies that they are sub-human, 'no right is more precious than suffrage because other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined'. This is damaging both to their dignity and sense of self-worth, exacerbating the very qualities which may have propelled them to commit the criminal acts. As the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission argued, granting prisoners the right to vote is a ‘powerful and positive tool to assist with social reintegration’ whilst working towards the rehabilitative goal of imprisonment.	Prisoners are justifiably condemned to 'civic death' as a result of their actions. People who have been sent to prison are rightly condemned to 'civic death'; they are shut away not only to protect society, but also to symbolize society's disgust at their acts. Theoretically, felons are deemed to have 'broken the social contract' and felt to not have the 'moral competence to participate in governing a society'. Although prisoners are no longer executed in many jurisdictions, the idea of "civic death" is that they lose the rights of citizens without dying in a literal sense. Those who offend against the common good of society should have no right to contribute to the governance of society. They can only be readmitted to society, both physically and in terms of their rights, when they have made amends to society by serving their sentence.