MOTION #85: THIS HOUSE WOULD ABOLISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The abolishment of
nuclear weapons would constitute the complete and multi-lateral disarmament of
all current nuclear weapons and material earmarked specifically for their
development or production.
Nuclear weapons first
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, forever changed the face of war, and
the half-century of Cold War which followed was dominated, above all, by the
threat of nuclear destruction. Both superpowers raced to produce a greater
arsenal than their opponents, leading to the point where they had the ability
to destroy the world several times over. Added to the direct destructive power
of the weapons was the consensus growing among scientists from 1970s onwards
that a major war would plunge the world into a ‘nuclear winter’, destroying
life even in places that had escaped attack. This led to the concept of
‘Mutually Assured Destruction’, a stalemate in which both sides knew that the
use of their weapons would lead to their own destruction as well as their
enemies.
The global situation
has, however, changed substantially since the end of the Cold War. Nuclear
Weapons have ceased to dominate world politics; however, the fear of
proliferation – the spread of weapons of mass destruction to many more
countries – is also on the rise. India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea are
all now believed to be nuclear powers, and many fear that Iran will soon join
them. Proponents focus on the total abolition of the world’s nuclear arsenals
as a realistic and necessary goal to aim for. It will take time, as President
Obama has recently argued “I'm not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly
–- perhaps not in my lifetime.” The opposition is more pragmatic, not defending
the weapons per se but insisting that they remain a necessary means to a
peaceful end.
President Obama has moved the idea of nuclear disarmament up the
international agenda. In Prague in 2009 he stated “So today, I state clearly
and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a
world without nuclear weapons.” Obama followed up with a Nuclear Security
Summit which sought to safeguard nuclear materials but did not much advance any
attempt to abolish nuclear weapons.
Pros
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Cons
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States should not possess such destructive, cataclysmic
weapons. Nuclear weapons are, by their
very nature, indiscriminate and disproportional; any weapon which could not
possibly be used in a responsible manner should not be permitted. Over the
past fifty years, we have seen a general tendency towards limited warfare and
precision weapons, allowing military objectives to be achieved with minimal
loss of civilian life. The entire point of nuclear weapons, however, is their
massive, indiscriminate destructive power. Their use could kill tens of
thousands of civilians directly, and their catastrophic environmental
after-effects would harm many more all around the world. These effects could
never be morally acceptable, particularly as the basis of one’s national
security strategy. They place ‘humanity and most forms of life in jeopardy of
annihilation’ (Krieger, 2003). No state or leader can be entrusted, morally,
with that power and responsibility.
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States have the right to possess any weapon that will
materially support their ambitions of survival, regardless of their destructive
power. There is no greater principle than that of self-defence, and a state
is entitled to develop any means by which it improves its position vis-à-vis
an enemy and subsequently promotes peace in the region and internationally.
Furthermore, the damage done by a nuclear weapon is no more indiscriminate or
disproportional than the damage potentially caused by a prolonged aerial
bombardment. In World War II for instance, far more damage was wrought by
fire-bombing Tokyo than either of the nuclear attacks. The issue is therefore
not whether nuclear weapons should be held, but under which circumstances
they are used, or threatened. Either way, they should not be abolished.
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The purported efficacy of nuclear deterrence drives
nuclear proliferation and therefore increases the risk of nuclear weapons
being utilized. By claiming the
efficacy of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent, the current nuclear
powers encourage the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Krieger,
2003). To be a part of the so-called 'nuclear club' is seen as a matter of
great prestige; when India and Pakistan recently declared their nuclear
capability and held mutual tests in the 1990s, it was seen in both countries
as increasing their international status. Nevertheless, tensions in the
region have only increased since the mutual announcements, not least the
Kargil War of 1999 that almost precipitated a nuclear war. Nations opposed to
a nuclear power therefore feel that they need to develop their own capability
in order to protect themselves. The declared nuclear powers must therefore
take the lead in disarmament, as an example for the rest of the world.
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States seek nuclear weapons not primarily in order to
use them, but in order to take advantage of the security they offer. If
states existed in a world post-disarmament, the incentives to develop nuclear
weapons for reasons of security would not have disappeared, in fact they
would have increased as no other state would be able to use their more
powerful conventional forces against that state. As Paul Robinson notes,
‘conventional armaments…will remain the backbone of U.S. defence forces, but
the inherent threat to escalate to nuclear use can help to prevent conflicts
from starting, prevent their escalation, as well as bring (them) to a swift
and certain end (Robinson, 2001)’. Such potential advantages will not be lost
on states in a nuclear-free world.
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Risk of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands. While nuclear weapons exist, they can fall into the
wrong hands. This is particularly prevalent in an environment whereby there
are extremist groups actively seeking to cause instant, egregious harm to
their ideological and political enemies. Such groups do not lack for funding;
therefore the fear of weapons falling into the wrong hands has never been
higher. This is particularly true in Russia, which now has control of all of
the nuclear weapons which were distributed around the former Soviet Union. In
particular during the 1990s the military was disastrously underfunded; technicians
and officers who were used to a high standard of living found themselves
without pay, sometimes for years. At the same time, other states and
extremist groups are willing to pay substantial sums for their services, and
to gain access to nuclear weapons. This same danger is now as much, if not
more, of a problem in Pakistan (Ambinder, 2011). The danger of a weapon being
stolen, or a nuclear base being taken over by disgruntled members of the
military or other extremists, can only be ended by destroying the weapons
(Allison, 1997).
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The abolishment of nuclear weapons does not reduce the
risk of them falling into the wrong hands. While nuclear weapons can be
dismantled, the weapons-grade plutonium which forms their warheads cannot
simply be destroyed. Instead, they must be stored in special facilities; in
Russia, there are some three hundred sites were military nuclear material is
stored (National Intelligence Council, 2002). It is producing this plutonium
which is in fact the most difficult stage in building a weapon - by
dismantling missiles, you are therefore not destroying their most dangerous
part, and hence the risk of theft does not decrease. In fact, it may
increase: missile silos in Russia are still the most heavily funded part of
the military, whereas in recent years it has become clear that security at
storage facilities is often inadequate. Moreover, it is far easier to steal a
relatively small quantity of plutonium than an entire Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile; there were three such incidents in Russia in the 1990s of
weapons-grade uranium theft (National Intelligence Council, 2002).
Ironically, the safest place for plutonium in present-day Russia may be on
top of such a missile.
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Both the use and threat of nuclear weapons are illegal. The disproportionate and indiscriminate nature of
nuclear weapons use renders their possession illegal under international
humanitarian law. The International Court of Justice in 1996, asked to
provide an advisory opinion, declared unanimously that any use or threat of
nuclear weapons had to be compatible with existing international law relating
to armed conflict (International Court of Justice, 1996). The principles of discrimination and
proportionality inherent in the laws of wars are codified in the Geneva Conventions
of 1949, and are quite clearly violated by nuclear weapons. As such, a
majority of the judges present felt that any such use or threat would
‘generally be contrary’ to those rules of international law and therefore,
unanimously, ‘there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to
a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects
under strict and effective international control’ (International Court of
Justice, 1996).
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The Count was only asked to provide an advisory
opinion; their adjudication had no subsequent basis in law. Anyhow, the very
same jury voted unanimously that ‘there is in neither customary nor
conventional international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of
the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such’ (International Court of
Justice, 1996). Unlike biological and chemical weapons, for which specific
treaties have been developed to regulate and prevent their use, the absence
of regulation for nuclear weapons implicitly recognizes wide-held
appreciation for their deterrent effects
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Nuclear weapons can be abolished through the
co-operation of nuclear powers and the establishment of an independent
verification system. The co-operation of
the United States and Russia, demonstrated in their regularly-renewed START
treaties, confer the ability of nuclear powers to work towards a reduction in
nuclear stockpiles. A new campaigning body, Global Zero, has laid out the
path to nuclear abolishment, concerning first bilateral accords to reduce
stockpiles in the manner already occurring. From there, they advocate the
‘universal acceptance of a comprehensive verification and enforcement system
accompanied by tighter controls on fissile materials produced by
civil-nuclear programmes’ (The Economist, 2011). The process will not be
swift, but it is plausible and not a stretch considering the success of
previous START treaties and the example of the International Atomic Energy
Agency as an independent body charged with verifying nuclear installations.
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The process is implausible, primarily because whilst
the actual weapons can be dismantled, the technology remains and the only
effective means to deter the development of a nuclear weapon is a nuclear
weapon. Even if this were not the case, such a gradual and incremental
process of disarmament does not account for the weapons held by states who
have not officially declared their presence, like Israel. Furthermore, though
a verification agency may have universal access to nuclear stockpiles, it has
little power to enforce states to adhere to treaties, precipitating the
scenario whereby one state refuses to give up its final weapon and stalling
the process indefinitely. Finally, this process assumes that states wish to
see nuclear weapons abolished, rather than the more common assumption that
states view nuclear weapons as necessary, not merely to deter other nuclear
powers but for traditional deterrence and nuclear blackmail. Would all states
willingly give that up
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The idea of a so-called 'nuclear deterrent' no longer
applies – the United States would not be deterred from attacking a newly
nuclear Iran because the U.S. would have a first strike capability so would
be able to wipe our Iranian nuclear weapons before they could be used. While
it is true that political leaders on both sides during the Cold War were
terrified of a nuclear conflict it was as much the balance of power that
maintained the peace. Neither superpower had an advantage large enough to be
confident of victory. However, there is no longer nuclear deterrence. With
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, some rogue states may develop the
ability to strike at enemies who have no nuclear weapons of their own. Unless
the country under attack is allied to another nuclear power It is not clear
that any of the major nuclear powers would then strike back at the aggressor.
This is further complicated by the fact that most of the emerging nuclear
threats would not be from legitimate governments but from dictators and
terrorist groups. Would it ever be acceptable to kill thousands of civilians
for the actions of extremists?
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Nuclear weapons are
required for deterrence. The use of nuclear
weapons would indeed be a great tragedy; but so, to a greater or lesser
extent, is any war. The reason for maintaining an effective nuclear arsenal
is in fact to prevent war. By making the results of conflict catastrophic, a
strategic deterrent discourages conflict. The Cold War was in fact one of the
most peaceful times in history, particularly in Europe, largely because of
the two superpowers' nuclear deterrents: ‘the principal function of nuclear
weapons was to deter nuclear attack’ (Record, 2004). During the Gulf War, for
example, one of the factors which prevented Iraq from launching missiles
tipped with chemical weapon warheads against Israel was the threat the USA
would retaliate with a nuclear strike. Although there is no longer as formal
a threat of retaliation as there was during the Cold War, the very possibility
that the use of nuclear weapons by a rogue state could be met a retaliatory
strike is too great a threat to ignore. Moreover, although the citizens of
the current nuclear powers may be against the use of force against civilians,
their opinions would rapidly change if they found weapons of mass destruction
being used against them.
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In 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. The treaty, which calls for
an end to all nuclear testing, includes provisions for extensive and
independent mechanisms for the monitoring of nuclear activities. Such
mechanisms could easily be co-opted for use in implementing, monitoring and
verifying any future nuclear disarmament process.
"The de facto global nuclear test moratorium and
CTBT’s entry into force are crucial barriers to help prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons to additional states and are essential to the future
viability of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). They are the first
two of the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive nuclear
disarmament that were unanimously adopted in the Final Document of the 2000
NPT Review Conference (Kimball, 2005).” Even if countries could rapidly
produce a bomb without any testing they would not be able to see if it works
and any state engaged in breakout would take time to make their bomb
deployable on delivery vehicles.
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Abolishment is an
unrealistic goal. The nuclear genie
is out of the bottle, and there is no way to go back. Nuclear technology
exists, and there is no way to un-invent it (Robinson, 2001). Much as the
ideal of global disarmament is fine, the reality is that it is impossible: it
takes only one rogue state to maintain a secret nuclear capability to make
the abolition of the major powers' deterrents unworkable. Without the threat
of a retaliatory strike, this state could attack others at will.
Similarly, the process by which nuclear weapons are
produced cannot easily be differentiated from the nuclear power process;
without constant oversight it would be possible for any state with nuclear
power to regain nuclear capability if they felt threatened. This is the same
as the nuclear ‘breakout’ capability that many states such as Japan have
whereby they can create a nuclear bomb in a matter of weeks or days – if a
country has nuclear power and the technology they have this capability even
when they have dis
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Nuclear weapons provide the source of the greatest
possible barbarity in warfare; therefore it is disingenuous to suggest that
their abolishment would only exacerbate conflicts. States do not start wars
with major powers contemporaneously merely because those major powers happen
to have nuclear weapons; traditional deterrence will still be as effective as
it is currently. Furthermore, the abolishment of nuclear weapons would allow
thereafter mutual co-operation on the issue of non-proliferation without the
current fear that others are only concerned with preventing proliferation in
countries likely to be opposed to their interests.
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Abolishment would be
counter-productive and only lead to greater barbarity in warfare. Nuclear weapons have a restraining effect on warfare,
preventing escalation through fear of their destruction. To abolish them is
therefore to act counter-productively: ‘it will not advance substantive
progress on non-proliferation; and it risks compromising the value that
nuclear weapons continue to contribute, through deterrence, to U.S. security
and international stability’ (Robinson, 2001) Nuclear weapons are a necessary
evil; the doctrine of mutually assured destruction prevented the outbreak of
nuclear war during the Cold War because in the neither side was willing to
risk the response and neither side could risk even a small scale war due to
the threat of escalation. Nuclear weapons therefore act as a check upon the
very institution of war between those states that have nuclear weapons,
restraining aggressors through fear of escalation and certain destruction.
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