THW ABOLISH THE SECURITY COUNCIL VETO

MOTION #93: THIS HOUSE WOULD ABOLISH THE SECURITY COUNCIL VETO 

The United Nations was established in 1945 by means of the Charter of the United Nations. The membership of the organisation currently comprises almost every recognised state in the world. Every member state is represented in the General Assembly where it holds a single vote. This forum holds debates on any matter within the scope of the Charter and passes decisions by a simple majority or exceptionally a two thirds majority of members present and voting. Under article 24 of the Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for "the maintenance of international peace and security". This mandate includes the authorisation of the use of force for purposes other than self-defence. This body includes 5 permanent members or the P5; the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, and Russia. In addition, 10 seats on the Security Council are held by non-permanent member states that are elected for a term of 2 years. Although decisions of the Security Council are made by the affirmative vote of 9 of the 15 members, the P5 hold the power of veto over any such decision. Proponents of its removal argue that the conditions under which the P5 were granted their veto power are now out-dated and unfair whilst opponents maintain that it is a necessary element in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Pros	Cons
The veto power is a barrier to discourse, preventing the U.N. from acting where the majority of its member states want it to.  Purported U.N. actions that would clearly antagonise a member of the P5 never even reach the Security Council; such is the awareness that the veto would stall its progress. The statistics of the numbers of vetoes passed at any particular point in UN history does not reveal the true defect of the institutional arrangement. In an attempt to circumvent this, countries and military alliances are forced to act unilaterally. NATO initiated military action against Yugoslavia, under the imprimatur of the United States and the United Kingdom, without receiving Security Council authorisation. It had become evident that any UN military involvement would be vetoed by both China and Russia. Furthermore, the silence of the Security Council whilst Russia launched a relentless and brutal campaign against Chechnya was deafening. Nevertheless, there is little that can be done such is the absolute power of the veto that Russia and the other P5 members have.	The Security Council is a unifying force, regardless of its veto powers. Its history of mandating U.N. interventions to prevent humanitarian disasters is on the record and clear. Though many point to the Srebrenica massacre in the former Yugoslavia, few recall the success of the U.N. mission in bringing that conflict to a peaceful resolution. Furthermore, unilateral actions, undertaken without recourse to the Security Council, are often eventually rectified through the Council anyway. The legality of the NATO action in both Yugoslavia and Kosovo was subsequently scheduled for consideration by another organ of the UN, the International Court of Justice. Following the conflict NATO and Russia sought and achieved Security Council endorsement of the campaign. The Council then authorised the deployment of a peacekeeping force in order to police Kosovo. The Security Council thus proved to be a unifying force despite the presence of the veto power.
The veto is wielded as an ideological tool. In the rare recent circumstances in which the veto power has been utilised, it has been hijacked by ideological demands and petty national interests. The P5 are able to use their veto powers not to enforce legality, justice and transparency in the international environment, but rather appease their allies and punish their enemies. China prevented peacekeeping operations proceeding in Guatemala and Macedonia on account of the engagement of those countries with Taiwan1. The veto is no longer applied for the maintenance of collective security, but the substantiation of internal security.	The veto is not wielded as an ideological tool, but rather a tool of national interest like any other diplomatic tool. The recent case of Libya, whereby the veto power was not used by any of the P5, demonstrated the ability of the Security Council to align themselves to the cause of civilian protection. For this reason, it should also be noted that collective security is often indistinguishable from the national interests of the P5. The military might of each of the P5 members individually, and within separate groups, notably the UK and US axis within NATO, is such that the avoidance of disagreement is crucial to international peace. Even if the P5 did cast their vetoes for reasons of ideological self-interest, this cost is outweighed by the maintenance of unity that becomes ever more critical in the post-Cold War multipolar world.
The veto power is an anachronism that does not suit the contemporary international society and it's power relations. The permanent five (P5) were given this privilege for two reasons that have no application in the post-Cold War world. Firstly, the Allied powers, with the addition of China, sought to bind themselves to the UN organisation that was designed to prevent the depredations of the Second World War ever recurring. Secondly, the P5 held unrivalled strategic might through their possession of nuclear weapon technology or imminent nuclear capacity. Yet, the UN is no longer in any danger of imminent collapse. The P5 will abandon neither the organisation nor the cause of global peace by loss of the veto power. Moreover, the global power balance has shifted dramatically since 1945; the P5 'do not reflect the geopolitical realities of today'. Nuclear proliferation has accelerated in the past decade, such that inter alia India, Pakistan, North Korea, Egypt, Iraq and Iran are developing inter-continental ballistic capacity.	The veto power is still as relevant as it ever was. As the opposition notes, the veto power was granted to ensure the victors in World War II that they could prevent the escalation to world war that had so ravaged their lands and populations. The maintenance of the 'long peace' over the subsequent half-century can be at least partially attributed to the effectiveness of the Security Council veto; the P5 are tempted away from military solutions towards diplomatic feuds due to their ability to bring overbearing political power to bear on rivals. For example, fears of Iran's acquirement of a nuclear weapon have been abetted by US-sponsored efforts to impose sanctions on the regime. Without the veto power, the Security Council would not remain in its current, useful form and may not have prevented a resort to war in this case.
The Permanent Five no longer contribute to the United Nations to a degree expected of their special status. Funding contributions to the United Nations should directly relate to the influence that member organizations thereafter have on its actions; with the veto in place, this is no longer the case. The Permanent Five, as the group of nations granted the most constitutional power in the United Nations, should contribute a proportional amount of resources to the institution. Initially, this was the case – however, by 2004, Japan was contributing 19 per cent of the UN budget, second only to that of the United States. In third place, contributing 8 per cent, was Germany, another state lacking a veto power and any ability to overrule the interests of P5 nations, all bar one of whom contributed less to the UN budget. Furthermore, India and Brazil, whilst not contributing financially to the degree of Japan and Germany, have permitted large swathes of their armed forces to join U.N. peacekeeping operations to fulfil the mandates handed down by the Security Council. Despite these financial and military contributions, the states concerned get no greater say in the interests and actions of the organization. A fairer, more equitable model would insist on a greater proportionality between one’s contribution to the United Nations and one’s ability to influence its actions.	The efficacy of the United Nations Security Council is dependent on the participation of the world's most powerful states, which is in large part due to the possession of the veto power. Removing the veto, or granting it only to those who contribute their fair share to the United Nations budget risks undermining the very structures that have made the Security Council the platform for co-ordinated international action. For example, whilst China is not one of the top contributors to the budget of the organization, it's economic and military strength are enormous and if the Security Council is to remain relevant, China must be encouraged to remain at the table. The veto power ensures unilateralism is a secondary thought.
The Security Council knows it has to reform. All the Security Council members know that at some point there is going to have to be reform of the council. This will most likely mean more members being admitted to the Council. The three countries whose grasp on the Security Council is tenuous due to their relative power having declined; UK, France and Russia, will likely be willing to give up their veto in order to retain their seats. The United States and China would then have to follow or face the rest of the international community and devalue the United Nations. A half-way house would probably be agreed where the veto could be retained in a few areas much as it has been within the European Union decision making process. This could then be slowly eroded over time.
Treaties do not confer permanent and inalienable rights; they should be constantly subject to reform when their dictates conflict with the wishes of their voters. In an institution like the United Nations, which espouses self-determination, the existence of a power which is immune from reform is not a source of pride. If the veto powers had a right to the veto when they were first introduced, that right has now been lost in the chorus of disapproval found among the very same U.N. member states that granted them that right. In a political environment, if an elected official loses the will of their voters, the elected official does not get to choose whether they keep those elected powers. The power remains with they who grant the powers, the voters.	The veto power was granted legally to the P5 by the other participating states, and therefore the P5 have a right to those powers. There is no requirement in the UN Charter for the veto power to be distributed according to geopolitical realities. Whilst democracy and equality are the principles that direct the General Assembly, they were never intended to apply to the Security Council. The Security Council was conceived as the 'hegemonic' organ, designed to be responsible and effective. As such, the veto power was a tool to ensure the Security Council would not be encumbered by democracy. Therefore, the privileges of the P5 'appear as rights bestowed upon them' by the states who ratified the UN Charter in 19451. As a consequence, the non-permanent members of the UN Security Council have little to complain about when they themselves are responsible for their 'diminished status' under the Charter1. The price paid for their diminished status is the effectiveness of the Security Council.
Only the abolishment of the veto power would enable global action free from the political motives and inherent power politics of the veto powers. Absent of the veto, motions would be considered and passed on merit, not on the self-interest and political motives of the veto powers.As Tarik Kafala argues, 'the majority view at the Council would prevail and we might expect more resolutions passed, more situations identified as threats to world security, more cases of states being reprimanded and sanctions being imposed'1. Far from destabilising the world order, the removal of veto power would merely enshrine self-determination within the organization that purports to carry that principle to the world.	The veto power has proven a success in the maintenance of peace. The veto power has been wielded with increasing success both during and since the Cold War. Between 1945 and 1990, 240 vetoes were cast1. Yet between 1990 and 1999 the power was utilised on only 7 occasions, whilst more than 20 peacekeeping operations were mandated. This figure exceeds the total number of operations undertaken in the entirety of the preceding 45 years. The prodigious use of the veto during the Cold War period might have saved the world from the realisation of nuclear war. Now, increasing nuclear proliferation is a reason for maintaining the unity of the P5 by means of the veto. The current rhetoric concerns 'rogue states' gaining possession of nuclear weapons. These are states whose potential deployment of arms is unpredictable and with whom there is limited international dialogue. If the P5 is split on a matter of international security, any one or more of its members could become equally 'rogue'.
Constitutional change within the UN is possible and thus worthy of full discussion. As Richard Butler has observed, a proper debate about the defects of the veto might at the least yield a more constructive interpretation of the nature of the veto and its application1. An informed public awareness of the potential for the Security Council to be bypassed or hijacked might lead to pressure for exercise of the power in accordance with the Charter aims. Notably, China was persuaded or compelled not to cast the veto in respect of the Council measures on Kosovo. This reasonable approach prevailed in spite of vocal Chinese opposition to the bombing campaign, and the destruction of the Chinese embassy by NATO forces.	Abolition of the veto is practically impossible. The abolition of the power of veto is simply impossible to imagine. The P5 will not willingly cede their pre-eminent position in international politics. And unsurprisingly, each member would have the constitutional power of veto over any proposal to remove the veto. Articles 108 and 109 of the United Nations Charter grants the P5 veto over amendments to the charter, requiring them to approve stripping away their own veto powers. Given the influence wielded by a veto-bearing state, it is unlikely that any of the P5 would agree to give up this privilege. Therefore, this whole debate is undermined by the sheer impossibility of it being removed, without the wholesale destruction of the United Nations as an organization or, at best, as a relevant organization.
	The veto power reduces the risk of nuclear escalation. The P-5 veto holding members of the UN SC are unique in that they are the only countries that have nuclear arsenals (not simply a small stock of nuclear weapons). They are the only countries with the power to initiate full-scale nuclear war. Therefore, it is important that that they be able to end measures with their veto power to ensure that measures are not realized that could foment serious international tension and possibly nuclear war. In other words, 'you give (veto power) to the nations who- thanks to their nuclear missiles- already have effective veto power anyway'. The gift of the veto power encourages such nuclear states to act within the system, ensuring that 'they have a stronger stake in acting within the system than acting outside of it'.